Testing the Forensic Soundness of Forensic Examination Environments on Bootable Media by Mohamed, Ahmed F.A.L. et al.
University of New Haven
Digital Commons @ New Haven
Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science Faculty Publications
Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science
8-2014
Testing the Forensic Soundness of Forensic
Examination Environments on Bootable Media
Ahmed F.A.L. Mohamed
United Arab Emirates University
Andrew Marrington
Zayed University
Farkhund Iqbal
Zayed University
Ibrahim Baggili
University of New Haven, ibaggili@newhaven.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/
electricalcomputerengineering-facpubs
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons,
Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security Commons
Comments
(C) 2014 Digital Forensics Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Posted with permission. http://www.dfrws.org/2014/
proceedings/DFRWS2014-3.pdf
Dr. Baggili was appointed to the University of New Haven's Elder Family Endowed Chair in 2015.
Publisher Citation
Mohamed, A. F. A. L., Marrington, A., Iqbal, F., & Baggili, I. (2014). Testing the forensic soundness of forensic examination
environments on bootable media. From the Fourteenth Annual DFRWS Conference. Digital Investigation, 11, S22-S29.
Testing the forensic soundness of forensic examination
environments on bootable media
Ahmed Fathy Abdul Latif Mohamed a, AndrewMarrington a, *, Farkhund Iqbal a,
Ibrahim Baggili b
a Advanced Cyber Forensics Research Laboratory, College of Technological Innovation, Zayed University, PO Box 19282, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates
b Tagliatela College of Engineering, University of New Haven, West Haven, CT, USA
Keywords:
Bootable examination environment
Bootable CD
Bootable DVD
Hash functions
Differential analysis
a b s t r a c t
In this work we experimentally examine the forensic soundness of the use of forensic
bootable CD/DVDs as forensic examination environments. Several Linux distributions
with bootable CD/DVDs which are marketed as forensic examination environments are
used to perform a forensic analysis of a captured computer system. Before and after the
bootable CD/DVD examination, the computer system's hard disk is removed and a
forensic image acquired by a second system using a hardware write blocker. The images
acquired before and after the bootable CD/DVD examination are hashed and the hash
values compared. Where the hash values are inconsistent, a differential analysis is
performed on the image ﬁles. The differential analysis allows us to quantify and explain
the alterations made to the image ﬁles by the bootable CD/DVD examination. Our
approach can be used to experimentally validate new bootable CD/DVD distributions as
forensically sound.
© 2014 Digital Forensics Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
A plethora of forensic bootable CD/DVD/USB Linux dis-
tributions are available for use in digital investigations.
Both commercial and community-developed distributions
are available, and most make the claim that they provide a
forensically sound examination environment. The bootable
CD/DVDs are used by forensic examiners to boot into a
trusted operating system on the suspect's computer sys-
tem. This has numerous advantages in some scenarios:
1. Conducting a quick examination of the suspect's ma-
chine at the scene in a trusted operating system.
2. Examining the system without the need to perform a
time consuming hard disk acquisition where the sus-
pect's machine needs to be powered off and discon-
nected, the disk removed, and then acquired.
3. Acquiring an image of the RAM of a live system from a
trusted operating system, albeit with some degradation
caused by the reboot.
However, despite their utility, forensic bootable CD/
DVDs are known to have several problems which
compromise their utility and potentially call the digital
evidence they are used to collect into doubt
(Forensicswiki.org, 2012). Chief amongst these problems is
that the bootable live CD/DVD examination environments
may alter the suspect computer system's hard disks during
the examination process. Such an alteration calls into
question the forensic soundness of the examination.
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In this work we test various forensic bootable CD/DVDs
based on Linux, through an experiment to evaluate the
changes those CD/DVDs make to the suspect's hard disk. A
detailed, repeatable method is detailed for the testing of
bootable CD/DVDs and bootable USB devices designed for
forensic examinations. We use differential analysis to ﬁnd
the nature and quantify the extent to which those distri-
butions change the suspect's hard disk. From these exper-
iments we draw ﬁndings and propose future work.
Related work
Conducting forensic investigations is becoming more
challenging due to the pervasive nature of internet and the
increasing size of computer storage media, including hard
drives and tape devices (Adelstein, 2006). The traditional
approach to computer forensics, where an investigator ﬁrst
switched off the suspect's machine, took it to a laboratory,
removed the hard disk and then took images of conﬁscated
computer hard disk for further analysis is time consuming.
On the principle that “justice delayed is justice denied”, it is
often preferable to conduct some sort of triage or pre-
liminary investigation in situ e indeed, this may even elicit
a confession from a suspect when confronted with evi-
dence of their wrong doing at the scene (Casey et al., 2009).
Forensic examination environment boot media can be used
in these cases in three main ways:
 To provide “known-good” binaries for live analysis of a
system.
 To conduct a dead analysis of the system at the scene
without the need to disassemble the computer, and
image its hard disk drive.
 To use the suspect's hardware to examine the disk in
cases where the forensic examiner may not have access
to specialist or legacy hardwarewhichmay be necessary
to image certain types of hard disks.
In all of these types of investigation, the suspect's computer
is being used to investigate activitieswhich have takenplace
on the suspect's computer, and thus itmay be askedwhether
weare conducting a live ordeadanalysis.Wedifferentiate on
the basis of whether the suspect computer's operating sys-
tem is being used by the investigator. Live analysis uses the
suspect system's operating system and its resources to
conduct forensics. By contrast, dead analysis takes place
when that operating system is no longer running, such as
when the computer has been booted into another operating
system from removable media (Carrier, 2005). To differen-
tiate between uses of forensic examination environments on
CD,DVDandother removablemedia,we call CD/DVDswhich
are used for live analysis “tools CDs” (or DVDs) and those
used for dead analysis “boot CDs” (or DVDs), since the sus-
pect computer will be rebooted using the operating system
on the opticalmedia in the second case.We should note that
the terms “live CDs” and “boot CDs” are often used inter-
changeably in the literature, among the Linux user com-
munity, and among the digital forensics community.
Live forensics gives access to information on running
processes, open network connections, and open Dynami-
cally Linked Libraries (DLL) in additional to nondvolatile
static information (Carvey, 2007). The main forensic pur-
pose of live CD/DVDs is in investigations where evidence is
likely to be found in memory or in other volatile storage
locations, where powering down or restarting the computer
for a dead analysis is likely to cause that evidence to become
corrupt, overwritten or otherwise irretrievable. Live CD/
DVDs can be used to provided trusted tools and utilities for
forensic analysis for an investigator to use rather than
depending on tools which are found on the suspect com-
puter's hard drive, which might be infected by malware or
be otherwise modiﬁed and unreliable. In this respect they
address to a limited extent the concern that live forensics
may be invalidated by low system integrity, but there are
still signiﬁcant problems in their use (Hay et al., 2009).
In this work we focus on boot CD/DVDs, not live CD/
DVDs, according to the distinction we have given above.
Although boot CD/DVDs are not subject to concerns about
system integrity caused by a compromised host operating
system, there is a growing awareness in the DF community
that forensic bootable CD/DVDs can still be problematic and
most particularly that their claims that the suspect's hard
disk will not be altered have rarely been tested. For
example, in the Forensics Wiki1 an excellent discussion of
the issues with forensic bootable CD/DVDs has been a
featured article for some time (Forensicswiki.org, 2012).
However, despite this growing awareness in the research-
active part of the DF community, the identiﬁed issues are
still commonplace in many bootable CD/DVD distributions,
and even where they have been ﬁxed, new versions
frequently reverse those ﬁxes.
Experimental testing of bootable CD/DVDs
We designed a simple experiment to test whether a
bootable CD/DVD examination altered the hard disk of the
suspect's computer system when the system was booted
using the bootable CD/DVD.
Equipment
In our experiments, we used standard equipment found
in most digital forensics laboratories. There were three key
devices, which will be described in more detail below, but
which, in generic terms can be described as:
1. A suspect computer.
2. A hardware write blocker.
3. A forensic workstation.
Our simple experiment should be easy to replicate in any
forensic laboratorywhich has reasonable stand-ins for these
three items, and the cabling to connect the three as appro-
priate. Speciﬁc requirements and details of the equipment
we used are discussed for each of these three items below.
1 http://www.forensicswiki.org.
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Suspect computer
Our suspect computer had a single hard disk drive and a
bootable optical media drive e the simplest conﬁguration
which would be encountered in the ﬁeld. The computer
was conﬁgured to boot from the optical drive before the
hard disk drive. The format and state of the hard disk drive
is the most crucial feature of the suspect computer for the
purposes of the experiment. Bootable CD/DVDs should be
tested on all ﬁle systems which they are intended to
examine e this means that the methodology described in
the Methodology Section should be repeated for as many
different suspect computers with as many different ﬁle
systems as are necessary to provide sufﬁcient test coverage.
In our experiments, we used several suspect computers
running Windows XP. In all cases, the hardware and soft-
ware speciﬁcations of the suspect computer was the same.
We used IBM Thinkpad T42 laptops as the suspect com-
puters in our experiments. Although an old model, they are
common in our laboratory, and their relatively small 40 GB
hard disk makes the image acquisition steps in the Meth-
odology Section faster. The suspect computers used in our
experiments all had Windows XP installed, and their hard
disks were formatted using the NTFS ﬁle system.
Hardware write blocker
A hardware write blocker is a device which sits between
a hard disk and a forensic workstation which blocks in-
structions sent to the disk to write data, but allows in-
structions sent to read data. There are a variety of write
blockers available. In our experiments we used a Tableau
eSATA Forensic Bridge write blocker, as shown in Fig. 1. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology runs a
Computer Forensic Tool Testing program, and have labora-
tory tested a number of hardware write blockers (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), any of which
would be suitable for use in experiments following the
methodology we outline in the Methodology Section.
Forensic workstation
The forensic workstation, which was used to create
bitwise images of the suspect computers before and after
examination using the bootable CD/DVD forensic
examination environments, was a Lenovo desktop com-
puter of the following speciﬁcations:
 Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q8400 @ 2.66 GHz
 8 GB RAM
 2 TB external hard disk for storage of bitwise image ﬁles
of suspect computers
 AccessData FTK Imager v3
 AccessData FTK 1.71
 WinDiff
Methodology
Each bootable forensic examination environment was
tested according to the following methodology:
1. An artiﬁcial “suspicious usage” scenario was performed
on the suspect computer.
2. The suspect computer's hard disk was removed from
the (powered down) suspect computer.
3. The suspect computer's hard disk was connected to a
hardware write blocker (see Fig. 2).
4. The write blocker was connected to the forensic
workstation.
5. An image of the suspect computer's hard disk was ac-
quired using FTK Imager (call this image img).
6. The suspect computer's hard disk was disconnected
from the write blocker.
7. The suspect computer's hard disk was reinstalled in the
suspect computer.
8. The suspect computer was booted from the bootable
media containing the forensic examination
environment.
9. A forensic examination of the suspect computer's hard
disk was performed using the tools on the bootable
media.
10. The suspect computer was shut down gracefully.
Fig. 1. Hardware write blocker.
Fig. 2. The suspect hard disk connected (via IDE adapter) to the write
blocker.
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11. The suspect computer's hard disk was removed from
the suspect computer.
12. The suspect computer's hard disk was connected to the
write blocker (and forensic workstation) once again.
13. An image of the suspect computer's hard disk was ac-
quired using FTK Imager (call this image img0).
14. Hash values were calculated for img and img0.
If the hash values for the two images matched, then the
bootable CD/DVD examination did not alter the suspect
computer system's hard disk. If the hash values for the two
images did not match, then the bootable CD/DVD examina-
tion altered the suspect computer's hard disk. We generated
SHA1 hash values for all images in our experiment.
In our experiment we examined the following bootable
forensic examination environments:
 Knoppix v7.0
 Helix 3 Pro 2009R3
 Kali Linux v1.0
This list is by no means exhaustive. The methodology we
have employed is easily repeatable and can be applied to
test anybootabledigital forensics examination environment.
Differential analysis
Differential forensic analysis compares twodisk images (or
other pair of equivalent artifacts) to reveal and attempt to
explain thedifferences between them(Garﬁnkel et al., 2012).
By taking the image of the suspect computer's hard disk
acquired before the bootable CD/DVD examination, and the
image of the suspect computer's hard disk acquired after the
bootable CD/DVD examination, we are able to perform a
differential analysis and quantify the changes to the suspect
computer's hard disk which occurred as a result of the
bootable CD/DVD examination. We wanted to ﬁnd out what
changes were made by the bootable CD/DVD examination
andwhether those changes seemreasonable andpredictable.
The question of predictability is important. Although a
bootable CD/DVD examination may alter a hard disk, if it
alters theharddisk in apredictableway, and that alteration is
both minor and documented, then the examination process
may still be considered forensically sound, even if it is not
ideal. Outside of the digital forensics discipline, there are
many other forensic scienceswhichmodify samples in some
way. Evenwithin digital forensics, in many investigations of
small scale digital devices such as smart phones, it is
necessary to install a rootkit on the device (as in (Al Mutawa
et al., 2012)) or to modify a non-user partition (such as the
Android recovery partition as in (Vidas et al., 2011)) in order
to acquire an imageof thedevice's primary storage.Although
altering the original evidence is undesirable, we contend
that alterations are permissible so long as they are:
1. Minimal in terms of their impact upon the data which is
of evidentiary value,
2. Well-understood in terms of the nature and extent of
those alterations, and
3. Documented properly and in sufﬁcient detail so as to
accurately represent the cause, nature, and extent of the
alterations.
It might be argued that since, unlike the modiﬁcations
which are sometimes necessary in forensic examinations of
mobile phones, we are able to acquire evidence from com-
puter hard disks withoutmodifying them through the use of
write blockers, the question of whether a bootable CD/DVD
examination causes predictable changes or not is moot. We
contend that it is not, since in some investigations itmay not
be practical to disassemble a computer and remove its hard
disk to be plugged into a hardware write blocker and either
imaged or directly examined on a second computer. In some
investigations, such a process may be considered unneces-
sarily or unfairly disruptive to the operations of a business,
for example, especially in cases where that business may be
simply a third-party whose disks may contain relevant evi-
dence. In these cases, the use of bootable CD/DVD exami-
nation environments which cause only predictable changes
to the hard disk may still be acceptable.
We performed our differential analysis manually using
FTK's differencing features (as discussed in (Garﬁnkel et al.,
2012)), which allowed us to identify which ﬁles had
changed, which had been added, and which had been
removed when comparing images taken before and after
the use of the bootable forensic examination environment.
We added both images to a case in FTK and excluded
“duplicate” ﬁles/items. On FTK, when a ﬁle occurs twice
within a case, the ﬁle encountered second is marked as the
duplicate and the ﬁle added ﬁrst is marked as the “primary”
ﬁle. In order to exclude ﬁles/items which existed on both
images, we therefore manually omitted items marked as a
primary through sorting evidence items. This left us with a
list of ﬁles/items recovered from unallocated space which
either existed only on one image, or were different between
the two images. During our experiments, we found that it
was simpler to export a list of evidence items from FTK for
each disk, and to use diff to compare the lists and draw
attention to the ﬁles which had been added/removed/
changed than to use FTK's “duplicate” ﬁlter. Exported lists
were easier to refer to again later as well.
Findings
In this section we present our ﬁndings after conducting
simulated investigations using several popular bootable
forensic examination environments, all based on the Linux
operating system. In all environments, we mounted the
suspect computer's hard disk (read-only) manually (auto-
mounting was disabled if we had that option), and con-
ducted keyword searches for terms relevant to our simu-
lated suspicious usage scenario.
Knoppix
Knoppix is one of the most popular bootable Linux en-
vironments, although it is not speciﬁcally designed for
digital forensics. Despite this, it has a long tradition of being
employed in digital forensics (Willis, 2003), and is the basis
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for several forensics/security focused bootable media Linux
distributions. We performed this experiment using Knop-
pix 7.0, which we downloaded as an ISO ﬁle and then
burned to a blank CD to create our Knoppix boot CD. We
used the following command to mount the suspect com-
puter's primary hard disk partition as read-only:
sudo mount -t ntfs-3g -o ro /dev/sda1 /media/
sda1
As can be seen in Table 1, the SHA1 hash values calcu-
lated for img and img0 were different, and thus Knoppix
altered the suspect computer's hard disk during the course
of the examination. We therefore performed a differential
analysis in order to quantify this change.
Further, after conducting our keyword searches, we
attempted to create ﬁles on the suspect computer's hard
disk out of interest. Knoppix allowed us to do so just using
the graphical shell logged in as the default user, which
obviously changed the disk again. These changes were
made despite the disk supposedly being mounted as read-
only. Care must be exercised to avoid creating ﬁles when
using Knoppix in real investigations.
The total number of ﬁle items reported by FTK for both
img and img0 was 77,295. Therefore the Knoppix examina-
tion process did not add any ﬁles. We also found no dif-
ference in the size of any individual ﬁles or in the size of the
image as a whole. The only differences we found were in
the last access date and time for four ﬁles:
1. C:y[root]y$I30
2. C:y[root]y$MFT
3. C:y[root]yDocuments and
SettingsyAdministratory Local
Settingsy$I30
4. C:y[root]yProgram Files]Cisco Packet
Tracer 5.3.1ysoundsy simulationTab.wav
While noneof these changes are desirable, theﬁnalﬁle in this
list is particularly perplexing. Unlike $I30 or $MFT, which
contain ﬁle system metadata, the simulationTab.wav ﬁle
is part of the laboratory SOE installed on the laptops which
served as the suspect computers in our experiment. It is an
audio ﬁle used as part of an application. Although nothing
was changed but the access date, the change to this ﬁle was
especially concerning, as it suggests that any ﬁle on the sus-
pect computer's hard disk could be changed by Knoppix's
mounting and keyword search processes. On this basis we
conclude that Knoppix is inappropriate for use as a bootable
forensic examination environment.
Helix3 Pro
Helix3 Pro is a forensic examination environment on CD
which can serve as both a live CD and a boot CD. We tested
it as a bootable forensic examination environment. Unlike
Knoppix, Helix3 Pro is a commercial product and is
explicitly marketed as a forensics tool. Users therefore have
a reasonable expectation of forensic soundness.
As can be seen in Table 2, img had a different SHA1 hash
value to img0, and therefore we can say that we altered the
hard disk when we mounted it and performed keyword
searches using Helix3 Pro. We used the following com-
mand to mount the suspect computer's primary hard disk
partition as read-only:
mount -t ntfs-3g -o ro /dev/hda5 /mnt/hda5
We performed a differential analysis on the two images
in order to quantify the change.
Using FTK we noticed no change in the number of ﬁle
items found on img and img0. However, whenwe generated
a list of ﬁle items from each image, and performed differ-
encing2 on the list, we found that the access times had
changed for the following three ﬁles:
1. C:y[root]y$I30
2. C:y[root]y$MFT
3. C:y[root]yWINDOWSy bootstat.dat
These ﬁles seem to be accessed during the process of
mounting thesuspect'sharddiskusingHelix3Pro.Noneof the
“user data” ﬁles in the img0 hard disk image had been modi-
ﬁed. The contents of these system ﬁles listed in Table 2 have
not been changed e just the accessed timestamps. Although
no changes are desirable, we conclude that the changesmade
to theharddiskbyHelix3Promaybeminimal andpredictable
enough that its use can be considered forensically sound.
Kali
Kali Linux is a penetration testing distribution of the
Linux operating system, which has evolved from the pop-
ular BackTrack distribution. Like BackTrack, it also includes
many tools for digital forensics. We used the Kali Linux 1.0
DVD ISO to create a bootable Kali DVD. Using the boot DVD,
we investigated our artiﬁcial suspicious usage scenario. Kali
automatically mounted the partition as read/write at boot.
We immediately unmounted the partition and mounted it
as read-only using the following command:
mount -t ntfs-3g -o ro /dev/sda5 /mnt/sda5
As can be seen in Table 3, img had a different SHA1 hash
value to img0, and therefore we can say that we altered the
hard disk when we mounted it and performed keyword
searches using Kali Linux. As before, we performed a dif-
ferential analysis on the two images in order to quantify the
change.
Table 1
Comparison of images for Knoppix v7.0
Image SHA1 Hash Value
Img e942df9b391053ce33a2ddfc8cdd19713413e43a
img0 fd041692beb80245c6468ae13a087b0df61cd092
Table 2
Comparison of images for Helix3 Pro 2009R3.
Image SHA1 Hash Value
Img 6aa81d809c1c2bdff55baa8d4a8a95682718344d
img0 d454ab49357118618daaad214a40b66dc0ebd7df
2 Using WinDiff.
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Using FTK we noticed an additional ﬁle item in img0
when compared to the number of ﬁle items found on img.
The additional ﬁle was a thumbnail graphics ﬁle. The new
ﬁle was a duplicate of an existing ﬁle found on img and in
another location on img0. Strangely, when we generated a
list of ﬁle items for each image and compared them using
WinDiff, we could not identify the reported additional
graphics ﬁle. It is possible that FTK reported its existence in
the “Overview” pane erroneously, or that the ﬁle item was
otherwise not shown in the ﬁle list, possibly as a result of a
software bug. In any event, based on the comparison of the
two ﬁle lists, the following ﬁles had different access times
on img0, with no other changes to ﬁle size or contents:
1. C:y[root]y$I30
2. C:y[root]y$LogFile
3. C:y[root]y$MFT
4. C:y[root]yWINDOWSy bootstat.dat
These ﬁles seem to be accessed during the process of
mounting the disk using Kali. We are unable to explainwhy
FTK reported an additional thumbnail graphics ﬁle in img0
as compared to in img and why we were not able to locate
this ﬁle in our exported ﬁle lists. However, as the ﬁle was
reported as a duplicate of an existing ﬁle only in the
“Overview” pane of FTK, we assume its creation would not
interfere overmuch with a forensic investigation. We can
only assume that FTK's overview panel misreported the
total number of thumbnails. No ﬁles in the “user data” areas
of the disk appear to have been modiﬁed by the mounting
and keyword search process in Kali. However, the auto-
matic booting of the partition as read/write at boot time
makes Kali inappropriate for use as a bootable forensic
environment.
Future work
We see four major items of future work coming out of
this work. The ﬁrst is a new set of experiments involving
multiple computers with a variety of “common” conﬁgu-
rations, in order to evaluate whether the bootable CD/DVD
distributions we have tested make predictable alterations,
or whether the alterations are different after every exam-
ination. The second is the expansion of our testing to a
much broader set of bootable forensic examination envi-
ronments, including non-Linux based environments and
more commercial tools. The third is a deeper differential
analysis of images generated during our testing process.
The primary beneﬁt of the second and third items of future
work will be to raise awareness about the alterations (if
any) made to hard disks during routines conducted with
the tested bootable forensic examination environments,
and to assist in the answering of the question about
whether those distributions are suitable for use in forensic
examinations of the host computer's hard disks. The fourth
major item of future work is to investigate the causes of the
changes made by tested distributions and of the variables
involved which may contribute to, mitigate, or prevent
such changes.
Predictability
By performing a differential analysis on pairs of images
frommultiple computer systems, we can establish whether
the changes which are made by a given bootable CD during
the examination process are similar on several different
suspect computers. The purpose of performing the differ-
ential analysis on pairs of images from multiple computers
is to attempt to determine whether the changes made by a
bootable CD examination are predictable.
Broader testing
There are more Linux live/boot CD/DVD distributions
than just those we have tested in this work. We would like
to undertake a program of systematic testing of forensic
examination environment boot CD/DVDs and bootable USB
drives, including those based on operating systems other
than Linux. All boot mediawould be tested according to the
methodology discussed in the Methodology Section. We
expect, however, that the results would be similar to those
reported in the Findings Section.
Deeper differential analysis
Garﬁnkel, Nelson and Young have developed some
automated tools for differential analysis (Garﬁnkel et al.,
2012), dependent on the generation of DFXML (Garﬁnkel,
2012) using the “ﬁwalk” software. We would like to be
able to employ automated differential analysis in the
future to make sure that we understand the full extent of
the alterations made by bootable forensic examination
environments. This may also shine light on some of the
ambiguity we encountered with Kali using FTK. Also,
automated differential analysis could be incorporated into
scripts to automate much of the methodology we describe
in the Methodology Section, to more easily facilitate large
scale, rapid testing of bootable forensic examination
environments.
Root cause analysis
Since all of the bootable CD/DVDs we examined in this
work were Linux distributions, there are common
implementation details which will lead to common pit-
falls which some or all distributions may encounter.
For example, the auto-mounting of partitions is common
in many live CD/DVD Linux distributions, including
some intended for use in forensic examinations
(Forensicswiki.org, 2012). Mounting a partition, even as
read-only, may still lead to changes being made to that
partition, as we have seen in our Findings. Auto-
mounting a partition is even more perilous as the user
Table 3
Comparison of images for Kali Linux v1.0
Image SHA1 Hash Value
Img 1c473f5fee75dec2e9c2703f57d2a2bac0a59b75
img0 693bbfe4fd20b6afbd7f3d581501cd6402af3c6a
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may not even be presented with the option to attempt to
avoid changes being made.
In addition to common implementation details, there
are many details which will either be distribution-
speciﬁc, or case-speciﬁc. In this work we examined NTFS
ﬁle systems from Windows XP computers. In cases
involving Linux computers, using Ext3 and Ext4 ﬁle sys-
tems, mounting as read-only (using mount -o ro for
example) may still cause journal recovery actions on
damaged disks, modifying the disk (Suhanov, 2009).
Combined with auto-mounting of partitions, this issue
may be further compounded as even a user aware of this
problem when examining potentially damaged Ext3/Ext4
partitions may still inadvertently modify those partitions
just by booting a supposedly-safe forensic examination
environment.
While some preliminary work has been made publicly
available about the causes of problems using bootable
forensic examination environments, a major item for
future research is the systematic surveying of available
distributions for issues mounting common ﬁle system
types. This survey would deeply examine the default
conﬁguration of each surveyed distribution and the
forensic issues perculiar to each ﬁle system type. Such a
survey can both inform the development of future boot-
able forensic examination environments, and can help
examiners select the “safest” option from existing distri-
butions for the ﬁle systems they anticipate that they will
encounter in their case.
Conclusions
Using bootable media-based forensic examination en-
vironments has become important in digital forensic in-
vestigations. The notion of altering the data during a
forensic investigation has also become more acceptable,
providing that we knowwhat, where and howmuch of the
data is being altered. The results from this study indicate
that some data on the disk does change when using several
popular bootable CD/DVDs, and we document where these
changes take place using differential analysis helping both
digital practitioners and scientists understand what hap-
pens to a disk when a bootable CD/DVD is used on a
machine.
The results, summarized in Table 4, indicated a vari-
ation in the amount of data that is being changed on the
disk when Helix 3 Pro, Kali and Knoppix are used. All the
bootable CD/DVDs altered the disk, but none added any
ﬁles to the disk during the course of searching the disk
by ﬁle types and keywords. Knoppix allowed the disk to
be written to even when the user has mounted the disk
as read only, permitting us to create ﬁles using the
graphical shell, meaning that it would be easier for a ﬁle
to be accidentally created and the suspect's disk altered
by an examiner using Knoppix. Most of the changes
made by the bootable CD/DVDs we tested were in
C:y[root]y$LogFile, C:y[root]y$MFT and oc-
casionally in the ﬁle C:y[root]yWINDOW-
Sybootstat.dat. Knoppix also altered some other
ﬁles as well, which is documented in our Knoppix ﬁnd-
ings. In all cases the only modiﬁcations were the “last
accessed” timestamps. These changes are minimal, easily
attributed to the examination process (since the time-
stamp reﬂects the time of the bootable CD/DVD exami-
nation), and unless timestamps are somehow relevant to
the investigation, unlikely to have any evidentiary
impact. In Table 4 we have listed that the alterations
made by Helix3 Pro and Kali were acceptable in respect
of this minimal impact, however, given Knoppix permits
the user to write to the suspect's disk in addition to the
timestamp alterations, we have indicated that we do not
regard these alterations as acceptable for forensic use,
and we believe Kali's auto-mounting hard disk partitions
as read-write at boot time makes Kali unacceptable for
forensic use even though the alterations it made were
minimal. We stress that this assessment is our own, and
encourage others to make their own assessment of the
forensic soundness/acceptability of a given bootable
forensic examination environment for themselves on the
basis of their own testing.
We conclude that even though disk alterations are
made, they can be documented through experimentation,
which can help during an investigation when a question
arises on the integrity of using a bootable CD/DVD during
an investigation. With the proper testing to support their
choice of examination environment and to document and
explain any minor changes that environment may make
to the original disk, it may therefore be possible for an
examiner to justify the use of a particular bootable CD/
DVD. Whether any changes are justiﬁable or not, what is
certain is that rigorous testing of bootable forensic ex-
amination environments is required to support their
usage in digital forensics, and that such environments,
even community-developed forensics-dedicated distri-
butions, cannot be assumed to be safe without such
testing.
Table 4
Summary of results.
Helix3 Pro 2009R3 Kali v1.0 Knoppix v7.0
Hard disk altered? Yes Yes Yes
Files changed (hash values
differ) during search
$LogFile
$MFT
C:yWINDOWSy
bootstat.dat
C:y$I30
$LogFile
$MFT
C:yWINDOWSy
bootstat.dat
C:y$I30
$MFT
C:yDocuments And SettingsyAdministratory
Local Settingsy$I30
C:yProgram FilesyCisco Packet Tracer 5.3.1y
soundsysimulationTab.wav
Forensic usage acceptable? Yes No No
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